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Elaborating on Sham Transactions as Evidence of 
Violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute 
Jeffrey Schwartz 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An old proverb states: truth stands the test of time, but lies are 
soon exposed. The fraudulent actions of health care professionals are 
largely responsible for recent increases in health care costs.1 In 2000, 
the nation’s health care programs lost approximately $39 billion 
dollars because of fraud.2 Similarly, the government issued $12.1 
billion dollars in erroneous Medicare payments in 2001, many the 
result of fraud.3 Because the potential gain is so great, individuals 
both inside and outside the industry are willing to risk criminal 
liability by committing health care fraud.4  
Throughout the 1990s, the federal government dedicated 
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 1. Anne W. Morrison, An Analysis of Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral Law in Modern 
Health Care, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 351, 351-53 (2000); Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, Comment, 
The Medicare Anti-Kickback Provision of the Social Security Act—Is Ignorance of the Law an 
Excuse for Fraudulent and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 943, 944 (1996). 
 2. Health Care Fraud: A Serious & Costly Reality for All Americans, at 
http://www.nhcaa.org/pdf/all_about_hcf.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2002). “Other estimates by 
government and law enforcement agencies place the loss as high as 10 percent of . . . [the 
nation’s] . . . annual expenditure-or $130 billion-each year.” Id. 
 3. Id. Previous estimates reported that over $11.9 billion has been obtained through 
fraudulent Medicare claims. Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: 
Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 124 
(2001). Some have estimated that by 2008, health care spending will reach $2.2 trillion “and 
will account for 16.2% of the Gross Domestic Product.” Amy Schofield & Linda D. Weaver, 
Health Care Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 617, 618 (2000). 
 4. Nichole A. Berryman et al., Health Care Fraud, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 913, 915-16 
(2001) (stating that Medicare continues to be a target for fraud). See also Theodore N. 
McDowell, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments: Their Impact on the 
Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 713-14 (1987) (“Retrospective 
reimbursement creates incentives to increase the quantity and scope of services and . . . 
[o]verutilization becomes attractive.”). 
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significant resources toward combating and controlling fraud and 
abuse in federal health care programs.5 Although governmental 
efforts prevent some abuses, many lawbreakers have circumvented 
existing controls by creating transactions capable of disguising 
Medicare fraud.6  
Congress enacted the Anti-Kickback Statute to combat particular 
types of fraud in the health care industry.7 This Note discusses the 
origin and current state of the Anti-Kickback Statute, explores the 
concept of “sham transactions” and their role in preventing health 
care fraud, and enumerates proposals on how changes can be made to 
assist in the war against health care fraud. Part II of this Note 
examines the history of the Anti-Kickback Statute, the “intent” 
requirement, the federal regulations, and the exceptions and safe 
harbor provisions. Part III explores the theory of sham transactions 
and subsequent case law. Part IV of this Note analyzes how sham 
transactions apply to the Anti-Kickback Statute. Part V proposes the 
incorporation of sham transactions as circumstantial evidence 
demonstrating violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Part VI will 
summarize and conclude the Note.  
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
A. The Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b 
1. The Original Statute 
For decades, there were concerns about “the access of medical 
care and the distribution of health care costs in [the United States].”8 
 
 5. D. McCarty Thornton, “Sentinel Effect” Shows Fraud Control Effort Works, 1245 
PLI/Corp 69, 71 (April 2001) (claiming that “The investigation and prosecution of health care 
fraud has been a top priority of the federal government in recent years”). See also John T. Boese 
& Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce the 
Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1999) (claiming that as health care costs have 
steadily risen, Congress has demanded tougher prosecution of health care fraud).  
 6. Vavonese, supra note 1, at 951 (“Despite attempts at statutory solutions, fraud and 
abuse continue to be a costly problem”). 
 7. Robert N. Rabees, Kickbacks as False Claims: The Use of the Civil False Claim Act 
to Prosecute Violations of the Federal Health Care Program’s Anti-Kickback Statute, 2001 L. 
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 1, 2 (2001). 
 
 8. Tamsen Douglass Love, Note, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of “Willfully” 
in the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (1997). 
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Attempting to alleviate these concerns, in 1965 Congress created the 
Medicare/Medicaid system.9 The Social Security Amendments Act10 
incorporated the original Anti-Kickback Statute under the general 
antifraud section.11 This was, however, only a temporary solution 
because the Social Security Act did not address kickbacks and other 
inducements under Medicare and Medicaid.12 As a result, in 1972 
Congress made it illegal to solicit or offer kickbacks, bribes, or 
rebates in exchange for patient referrals under the Medicare or 
Medicaid system.13 This act made it a misdemeanor to receive bribes 
or other financial incentives in connection with the referral of patients 
under the Medicare or Medicaid system, or in the furnishing 
Medicare or Medicaid services.14 The legislative history indicates that 
the original statute intended to prevent unethical transactions draining 
federal health care programs.15  
 
 9. Id.  
 10. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 201, 97 Stat. 65, 107-08 
(1983). For a description of the Act’s application, see Douglas A. Blair, The “Knowingly and 
Willfully” Continuum of the Anti-Kickback Statute’s Scientier Requirement: Its Origins, 
Complexities, and Most Recent Judicial Developments, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 2 (1999). 
 11. See Love, supra note 8, at 1035. 
 12. Id. at 1035-37.  
 13. Id. at 1035. 
 14. Id. It is worth noting that there was no intent requirement under the 1972 statute. Id.  
 15. ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.13 (2001) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 108 
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093). Specifically, Congress stated: 
Your committee believes that a specific provision defining acts subject to penalty 
under the medicare and medicaid programs should be included to provide penalties for 
certain practices which have long been regarded by professional organizations as 
unethical, as well as unlawful in some jurisdictions, and which contribute appreciably 
to the cost of the medicare and medicaid programs. Thus, under the committee bill, the 
criminal penalty provision would include such practices as the soliciting, offering, or 
accepting of kickbacks or bribes, including the rebating of a portion of a fee or charge 
for a patient referral, involving providers of health care services. In addition, the 
provision would include penalties for concealing or failing to disclose knowledge of 
any event affecting a person’s right to any benefit payment with the intent to defraud, 
or for knowingly and willfully converting benefits or payments to improper use.  
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2. The Congressional Amendments 
Although the original statute appeared to address Congress’s 
concerns, numerous problems soon arose.16 Early cases addressing 
violations of the statute focused exclusively on whether or not 
someone had specifically violated the act.17 The central area of 
disillusion was whether a certain act was illegal based on a court’s 
interpretation of the terms “kickbacks or bribes.”18 Some courts 
narrowly construed these terms.19 To illustrate, in United States v. 
Zacher, the court addressed a nursing home operator over-charging 
the families of patients under Medicaid.20 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit had to determine whether the extra charges constituted a bribe 
under the Anti-Kickback Statute.21 The Second Circuit interpreted the 
definition of a bribe narrowly, as involving “corruption, breach of 
trust, or violation of duty,”22 and held that the nursing home operator 
did not violate the statute.23  
Other courts have offered a broader interpretation of “kickbacks 
or bribes.”24 In United States v. Hancock, the district court convicted 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 
5093.  
 16. Timothy J. Aspinwall, The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of Intent: The Case for 
a Rule of Reason Analysis, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 161 (2000). 
 17. See FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. In most of the cases, “the . . . facts of the 
. . . cases were rarely in dispute.” Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978). In Porter, physicians providing Medicare services were 
receiving payments for referring blood tests to certain laboratories receiving Medicare 
reimbursement. 591 F.2d at 1051. These blood tests were done manually and cost Medicare 
$214 as opposed to $35 at another facility through an automated system. Id. The Fifth Circuit 
had to determine whether the physicians violated the Anti-Kickback Statute based on the 
payments they received and the substantial difference in the reimbursement rates. Id. The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that there was authorization for Medicare reimbursement to the laboratories 
because the Anti-Kickback Statute did not include such actions under the kickback terminology. 
Id. at 1052-54. 
 20. 586 F.2d at 912. 
 21. Id. at 914. 
 22. Id. at 915. 
 23. Id. at 916-17. 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 121 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 
1002 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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the defendant for soliciting and receiving kickbacks.25 The court first 
determined the objective of the Anti-Kickback Statue,26 then 
considered whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague because 
an intent requirement was not incorporated into the statute’s 
language.27 The Seventh Circuit held that the term “kickback” 
requires one to receive payments for a corrupt purpose because the 
intent of the statute was to prevent an abuse of the federal 
government health care programs.28 
Other issues arose out of the original statute in addition to the 
problem of whether one should apply a narrow construction of the 
term kickback. One of these issues was that the original statute did 
not deter individuals from violating the statute because the offense 
was classified as a misdemeanor, not a felony.29 
 
 25. 604 F.2d at 1001. The defendants, licensed in chiropractic medicine, obtained blood 
and tissue samples from their patients and billed Medicare. Id. However, the defendants were 
receiving and soliciting money from the laboratory for the patient referrals. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1002. 
 28. Id. at 1001. The Seventh Circuit stated:  
[P]otential for increased costs to the Medicare-Medicaid system and misapplication of 
federal funds is plain, where payments for the exercise of such judgments are added to 
the legitimate costs of the transaction . . . [T]hese are among the evils Congress sought 
to prevent by enacting the kickback statutes . . . [T]his requirement of corruption is a 
sufficient requirement of mental culpability to withstand constitutional attack, 
especially in the context of Congress’ regulation of the expenditure of enormous sums 
of federal funds under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
Id. at 1001-02. 
 29. See Aspinwall, supra note 16, at 161. Specifically, Congress announced: 
Recent hearings and reports, however, indicate that such penalties have not proved 
adequate deterrents against illegal practices by some individuals who provide services 
under medicare and medicaid. In addition, these misdemeanor penalties appear 
inconsistent with existing Federal criminal code sanctions which make similar actions 
punishable as felonies. Also, it has been brought to the attention of the committee by 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices which have utilized these Social Security Act sanctions in the 
prosecution of medicare and medicaid fraud cases that the existing language of these 
penalty statutes is unclear and needs clarification.  
The bill would strengthen the penalty provisions in existing law which relate to 
persons providing services under medicare and medicaid. Most fraudulent acts now 
classified as misdemeanors would become felonies. Penalties for these acts would be 
increased to a maximum $25,000 fine, up to five years imprisonment or both.  
In addition, the bill would clarify and restructure those provisions in existing law 
which define the types of financial arrangements and conduct to be classified as illegal 
under medicare and medicaid.  
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3. The 1977 and 1980 Amendments 
Congress identified problems with the original 1972 statute, and 
made amendments in 1977.30 Specifically, Congress clarified what 
types of illegal acts constituted violations of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.31 The 1977 amendments made a violation of the statute a 
felony punishable by a fine up to $25,000 and/or five years in 
prison.32 Congress declared that evidence of illegal kickbacks could 
manifest in various forms, hence an expansive application of the 
statute was necessary.33 The 1977 Amendments noted that to violate 
the statute, the transaction did not have to result in a kickback.34 
Rather, Congress wanted to apply the Anti-Kickback Statute in a 
manner that demonstrated the severe consequences of illegal acts on 
federal health care programs.35 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, pt.2, at 53 (1977), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3039, 3055. 
 30. See Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, sec. 
1877, § 4(a), 97 Stat. 1175, 1179-81 (1997) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b(b) (1994)). 
 31. Aspinwall, supra note 16, at 161. See also H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, pt.2, at 53, 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3056. “Despite the 1972 amendments, congressional 
investigations revealed that provider fraud and abuse continued to proliferate.” William R. 
Kucera, Jr., Note, Hanlester Network v. Shalala: A Model Approach to the Medicare and 
Medicaid Kickback Problem, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 413, 418 (1996). 
 32. See Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 4(b)(1), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (1977) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1396(h) (1994)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, pt.2, at 53, reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3055.  
 33. Love, supra note 8, at 1037. 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, pt.2, at 46, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3056. “The 
expanded definition, which included the language ‘made or offered’ in exchange for a referral, 
also made the anti-kickback statute a stronger weapon against fraud and abuse practices.” 
Morrison, supra note 1, at 354-55. 
 35. Id. Specifically, Congress wanted to “give a clear, loud signal to the thieves and the 
crooks and the abusers that we [Congress] mean to call a halt to their exploitation of the public 
and the public purse.” 123 CONG. REC. S31767 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1977) (statement of Sen. 
Talmadge). Congress further stated: 
[F]raud in these health care financing programs adversely impacts on all Americans. It 
cheats taxpayers who must ultimately bear the financial burden of misuse of funds in 
any government sponsored program. It diverts from those most in need, the nation’s 
elderly and poor, scarce program dollars that were intended to provide vitally needed 
quality health services. The wasting of program funds through fraud also further 
erodes the financial stability of those state and local governments whose budgets are 
already overextended and who must commit an ever-increasing portion of their 
financial resources to fulfill the obligations of their medical assistance programs. In 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/11










2003]  Sham Transactions 363 
 
After the 1977 Amendments, Congress was concerned that the 
government would prosecute individuals for inadvertent acts 
violating the Anti-Kickback Statute.36 Reacting to this concern, 
Congress amended the act in 1980 to require a violator act knowingly 
and willfully.37 
4. The Current Anti-Kickback Statue 
In 1987, Congress consolidated the anti-kickback laws into 
section 112B(b) of the Social Security Act.38 The current Anti-
Kickback Statute39 provides that one cannot receive or offer illegal 
remuneration to induce business reimbursed under the 
Medicare/Medicaid system.40 Congress wanted to continue the 
original intent of the statute to cease practices that were draining 
federally funded health care programs’ resources through fraudulent 
transactions,41 even though the amendments exempted certain 
transactions from government prosecution.42 
 
addition to these adverse financial consequences, the activities of those who seek to 
defraud these programs unfairly call into question and honesty and integrity of the vast 
majority of practitioners and health care institutions. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-393(II), pt.2, at 44, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3047. 
 36. See Love, supra note 8, at 1038. “The Committee is concerned that criminal penalties 
may be imposed under current law to an individual whose conduct, while improper, was 
inadvertent.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 
5572. 
 37. Love, supra note 8, at 1038 (citing Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2625 (1980)). “Accordingly, the section clarifies current law to assure 
that only persons who knowingly and willfully engage in the proscribed conduct could be 
subject to criminal sanctions.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, supra note 36, at 59. 
 38. Pub. L. No. 100-93, sec. 1128, § 2, 101 Stat. 680 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b(b)). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 231 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093. See also 
Aspinwall, supra note 16, at 155 (“The primary purpose of this statute is to eliminate 
unnecessary health care costs and compromises in quality that can result when providers are 
given financial inducements to make referrals.”).  
 42. See FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 15, at 3-4. Even though the statute “has been 
amended several times to broaden its general application and provide for specific, limited 
exceptions (e.g. discounts, risk-sharing arrangements), these principles have remained at the 
core of the statute’s prohibitions.” Id. at 3.  
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B. The “Intent Requirement” Under the Anti-Kickback Statute 
An individual violates the Anti-Kickback Statute when he or she 
“knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration” for 
referrals paid under a “Federal health care program.”43 Courts have 
not provided consistent interpretations of the intent requirement of 
the Anti-Kickback Statute.44 Rather, courts have determined on a 
case-by-case basis whether the act was committed knowingly and 
willfully.45  
1. The Specific Intent Requirement 
The Ninth Circuit, in Hanlester Network v.Shalala,46 ruled that an 
individual must “know of” and “intend to” violate the law in order to 
be held criminally liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute.47 In 
Hanlester, the plaintiff (a corporation that owned medical 
laboratories)48 entered into a contract with SmithKline BioScience 
Laboratories (SKBL) which provided that SKBL would supply 
laboratory management services to the plaintiff.49 These contracts 
resulted in the plaintiff sending the majority of its laboratory testing 
to SKBL for a substantial profit.50 The Department of Health and 
Human Services eventually notified the plaintiff that its conduct 
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute.51 The plaintiff responded by 
arguing that the Anti-Kickback Statute was vague regarding whether 
or not someone must knowingly or willfully violate the statute to be 
held criminally liable.52 Addressing this argument, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1). 
 44. See Aspinwall, supra note 16, at 165-66.  
 45. Id.  
 46. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 47. Id. at 1400. This approach has also been employed by numerous other courts. See, 
e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146 (1994); United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 
1094 (5th Cir. 1998); Feldstein v. Nash County Community Health Services, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 
2d 673, 681 (E.D.N.C. 1999); United States v. Vaghela, 970 F. Supp. 1018, 1022-23 (M.D. Fla. 
1997). 
 48. 51 F.3d at 1394. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 1397. 
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held that a wrongdoer must engage in conduct with the “specific 
intent to disobey the law” for there to be a willful violation.53  
2. The One Purpose Test 
Other cases have interpreted the intent requirement like a strict 
liability standard, holding that any attempt to induce remuneration 
violates the statute.54 The Third Circuit in United States v. Greber 
employed this approach. In Gerber, a company providing physicians 
with treatment assessment services paid referring physicians for 
professional services.55 The Third Circuit held that if “payments were 
intended to induce the physician to use [the company’s] services, the 
statute was violated, even if the payments were also intended to 
compensate for professional services.”56 The Third Circuit adopted 
the one-purpose test, stating that if any purpose of a business 
arrangement is to induce referrals, one violates the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.57  
 
 53. Id. at 1400. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Hanlester relied largely on the United 
States Supreme Court case Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). In Ratzlaf, the 
Supreme Court determined that a “willful” violation of a statute requires the wrongdoer to 
“[know that] the structuring he undertook was unlawful.” Id. at 138.  
 54. See, e.g., United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1003-04 (10th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bay State 
Ambulance and Hospital Rental Service, Inc. 874 F.2d 20, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 55. 760 F.2d at 72. Basically, the company “billed Medicare for the monitor service and, 
when payment was received, forwarded a portion to the referring physician … The government 
charged that the referral fee was 40 percent of the Medicare payment, not to exceed $65 per 
patient.” Id. 
 56. Id. The court’s reasoning for this interpretation relied on the fact that “[e]ven if the 
physician performs some service for the money received, the potential for unnecessary drain on 
the Medicare system remains . . . [because] . . . [t]he statute is aimed at the inducement factor.” 
Id. at 71. 
 57. Id. at 72. The Third Circuit in Greber adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979), as the justification for the one-purpose 
test. 760 F.2d at 71-72. In Hancock, the court determined what the Anti-Kickback Statue was 
trying to achieve, and whether the statute was unconstitutional and vague because it did not 
have the word “intent” as an element of the crime. 604 F.2d at 1001-02. 
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3. The Middle Ground Approach 
Some courts have taken a middle ground approach, finding that 
the intent requirement of the Anti-Kickback Statute is satisfied when 
the wrongdoer knows their actions are wrongful.58 The Eighth Circuit 
in United States v. Jain embraced this approach. In Jain, the Court 
held that a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute occurs when 
evidence demonstrates that the accused knew that their actions were 
illegal.59 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the intent requirement 
established by the Supreme Court in Ratzalf v. United States,60 
relying upon Hanlester, was not applicable to the Anti-kickback 
Statute.61 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]he statute at 
issue in Ratzlaf made criminal a willful violation of another anti-
structuring statute . . . [while under] the Medicare anti-kickback 
statute . . . the word ‘willfully’ modifies a series of prohibited acts.”62  
 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff’d, 149 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 59. 93 F.3d at 440. The court defined the word “willfully” as “unjustifiably and 
wrongfully, known to be such by the defendant.” Id. The Eighth Circuit indicated that:  
Both the plain language of the statute, and respect for the traditional principle that 
ignorance of the law is no defense, suggest that a heightened mens rea standard should 
only require proof that [the defendant] knew his conduct was wrongful, rather than 
proof that he knew it violated ‘a known legal duty’. 
Id. at 441.  
 60. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).  
 61. 93 F.3d at 440-41. 
 62. Id. at 441. See also Love, supra note 8, at 1052-53 (discussing the relevancy of the 
Jain outcome); See generally United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995). In 
Neufeld, the Southern District Court of Ohio used the 1980 amendments to the Anti-Kickback 
Statute to determine the proper interpretation of “willful.” Id. at 496. Specifically, the court 
stated that Congress included the “knowingly and willfully” standard to protect individuals who 
inadvertently violated the Anti-Kickback Statute from prosecution. Id. The court determined 
that if someone’s purpose was to commit a wrongful act then there was a willful intent and a 
violation of the statute. Id. at 497. Moreover, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Hanlester and chose to follow the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Jain. Id. This logic appears to 
be consistent with the OIG’s interpretation of certain changes to the regulations, because there 
was concern about the “intent in changing certain language in the definition of discount from 
‘in exchange for any agreement to buy a different good or service’ to ‘to include (induce) the 
purchase of a different good or service.’” Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and 
Abuse; Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional 
Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 63,530 (Nov 19, 
1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2000)). The OIG responded to these concerns by 
indicating that the changed language was “consistent with the anti-kickback statute, which 
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C. The Federal Regulations of the Anti-Kickback Statute 
The House Report of 1972 indicates Congress’s concern with 
inappropriate transactions that drain resources and contribute to the 
rising cost of Medicare and Medicaid programs.63 At first glance, it 
appears that the Anti-Kickback Statue prevents all types of 
transactions. However, there are five statutory exceptions.64 When 
confusion emerged as to which arrangements qualified as 
exceptions,65 the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program 
Protection Act (MMPPA) of 1987, specifically required the 
development and promulgation of regulations.66  
In 1991, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) promulgated a 
series of “safe harbor” regulations.67 The OIG’s safe harbor 
provisions exempted certain business practices from criminal liability 
under the Anti-Kickback Statute which, on the surface, are capable of 
inducing referrals under federal and state health care programs.68 For 
example, the Anti-Kickback Statute does not always apply to general 
discount arrangements.69 Congress intended to permit discounts 
 
prohibits inducements to refer Federal health care program business, even if there is no actual 
referral made or agreement to refer.” Id.  
 63. See H.R. REP. NO. 231, at 108 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093 
(discussing ethical concerns and unlawful acts of professionals in the health care industry).  
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3). These exceptions include: discounts, payments to 
employees, vendor payments to certain group purchasing organizations, certain waivers of 
patient co-payments or deductible amounts, and payments under certain risk-sharing 
arrangements. Id.  
 65. Congress noted that “the existing language of . . . [the] statute is unclear and need[s] 
clarification.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3055. 
 66. See Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987). 
 67. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2000). 
 68. Id. The OIG’s creation of safe harbor regulations clarified those “business and 
payment practices that would not be treated as violations of the anti-kickback statute, even 
though they technically might not comply with its terms.” Linda A. Baumann, Navigating the 
Now Safe Harbor to the Anti-Kickbak Statute, 12 No. 3 HEALTH LAW 1, 1 (2000). The safe 
harbor regulations had a goal to permit “certain non-abusive arrangements, while encouraging 
beneficial and innocuous arrangements.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,518. In creating different 
amendments to the regulatory safe harbor provisions, the OIG examines provisions to ensure 
that additional exceptions correlate with the goals of the statute. Id. at 63,520.  
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A). Specifically, 
The bill would specifically exclude the practice of discounting or other reductions in 
price from the range of financial transactions to be considered illegal under medicare 
and medicaid, but only if such discounts are properly disclosed and reflected in the 
cost for which reimbursement could be claimed. The committee included this 
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between businesses and programs when the discount “could fairly 
[and equally] benefit the Federal health care programs.”70 The OIG 
noted that illegitimate discounts would create problems for federal 
health care programs possessing the authority to establish appropriate 
reimbursement levels without draining the programs’ ability to 
provide appropriate reimbursement.71 Nevertheless, the OIG created 
certain measures to ensure that the utilization of legitimate discount 
arrangements would continue in the industry.72  
 
provision to ensure that the practice of discounting the normal course of business 
transactions would not be deemed illegal.  
H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3056. Congress allowed 
discounting so as to “encourage providers to seek discounts as a good practice which results in 
savings to medicate and medicaid program costs.” Id. The OIG wanted to ensure that discount 
agreements based on arm’s length transactions were not subject to the restrictions of the statute. 
64 Fed. Reg. at 63,530. “The independent status of the safe-harbor provisions from the 
‘discount exception,’ however, does not mandate their isolation from each other when one is 
looking for guidance as to the proper interpretation and application of one of the statutory 
exceptions to criminal liability.” United States v. Shaw, 106 F. Supp. 2d 103, 113 (D. Mass. 
2000). Rather, “a court is wise to consider those discounting arrangements the regulatory 
agency, charged with aiding the implementation of and the corporate compliance with the 
statute, considers non-fraudulent and non-abusive under the safe-harbor provisions promulgated 
under the authority granted it by congress.” Id. 
 70. 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,529. The OIG stated that “Congress did not intend to include 
within this provision the practice of a seller giving away, or reducing the price of, one good in 
connection with the purchase of a different good.” Medicare and State Health Care Programs: 
Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,978 (July 19, 1991) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2000)).  
 71. Id. Specifically: 
[W]here the particular item that is being given away may result in a more effective 
means of delivering the supplies to the health care provider, these types of discounts 
cause problems because they often shift costs among reimbursement systems or distort 
the true costs of all the items . . . [making it] difficult for the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs to determine the proper reimbursement levels.  
Id. 
 72. Id. The OIG is very explicit in the regulations, and provides reporting methods for 
those transactions that incorporate discounts. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 1001.952(h). The discount safe harbor reporting methods focus on whether the entity is a 
buyer, seller, or offeror. The regulations note that a buyer is: “(i) a health maintenance 
organization (HMO) or a competitive medical plan (CMP) acting in accordance with a risk 
contract; (ii) an entity which reports its costs on a cost report [(e.g. hospitals or nursing 
homes)]; [or] (iii) an individual or entity [that seeks reimbursement through the submission of 
claims (e.g. physicians or pharmacies)].” 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(1)(i)-(iii). Although 
originally not permitted, rebate arrangements are permissible in certain situations. The OIG 
stated: 
Accordingly, we are defining a ‘rebate’ for purposes of the safe harbor as a discount, 
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Additionally, the 1999 the OIG report addressed other concerns 
related to discounts that were common and legitimate,73 especially 
those concerns relating to “bundled goods.”74 In response to these 
concerns, the OIG indicated that the purpose of limitations on 
discounts for bundled items and services was to ensure that federal 
health care programs benefited from such arrangements.75 The OIG 
emphasized that when federal health care programs benefit from the 
arrangements the exceptions would be applicable.76 
III. SHAM TRANSACTONS 
A. Theory and Background 
Sham transactions are transactions that attempt to circumvent the 
requirements of the Anti-Kickback Statute by manipulating the 
provisions of the OIG regulations.77 Such transactions are those that 
would satisfy the requirements of the OIG regulations’ safe harbor 
provision in form, but are “actually a facade for improper 
relationships hidden beneath.”78 The OIG assists prosecutors and 
 
the terms of which are fixed at the time of the sale and disclosed to the buyer at the 
time of sale, but which is not given at the time of sale. ‘Terms’ refers to the 
methodology that will be used to calculate the rebate (e.g. percentage of sales or a 
fixed amount per item purchased during a given period of time).  
64 Fed. Reg. at 63,529. For those buyers that fall under 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(1)(iii), there is 
no requirement for charge-based buyers to report discounts on costs or claims submitted to 
federal health care programs. They are required to “provide information documenting the 
discount upon request of the Secretary [of HHS].” 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,529.  
 The regulations note that a seller’s requirements for reporting depend on the type of buyer 
that is involved. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(2). A seller does not need to report the amount of the 
discount to the buyer if the buyer is an HMO 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(2)(i). For a cost report 
buyer, the seller must inform the buyer of the discount on the invoice and notify the buyer of its 
reporting obligations. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h)(2)(ii)(A) & (B).  
 73. 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,530. 
 74. Id. The OIG upheld their previous ruling declining the incorporation of bundled goods 
into the discount exception under the regulations. Id.  
 75. Id. at 63,529. In situations where an arrangement has the potential for fraud and abuse, 
the federal government might not be willing to take such risk and exempt an arrangement from 
the restriction of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Boese & McClain, supra note 5, at 28-29.  
 76. See supra notes 71-72 (discussing the OIG’s reporting requirements for services 
reimbursed by federal health care programs).  
 77. See infra notes 79-80 (discussing the OIG’s sham transaction proposals). 
 78. See FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.  
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those within the health care field in determining what types of actions 
provide evidence of sham transactions.  
The OIG regulations first addressed sham transactions that 
induced patient referrals from physicians through office leases, where 
the physicians did not use the office itself.79 The OIG indicated that 
this type of arrangement was one of the most frequent forms of Anti-
Kickback Statute violations.80 In 1994, the OIG proposed a rule that 
would address sham transactions.81 The OIG in 1999 declined to 
incorporate such a rule per se, as commentators indicated that the 
regulations were already too broad.82 Nevertheless, the OIG indicated 
that if the form of an arrangement did not correlate with the substance 
of the arrangement, the OIG would be entitled to investigate the 
transaction.83 The OIG indicated that a contract would not be 
protected by the safe harbor provisions if it was a sham transaction, 
and that the same criteria determined whether office and equipment 
leases were sham contracts for the other safe harbor provisions.84 
 
 79. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,972. The OIG has noted that “sham contracts in which 
remuneration is exchanged for property that does not exist or space which is not used are 
among the most egregious kickback arrangements.” Id.  
 80. Id. Specifically, in 1991 the OIG stated, “sham office leases in which the space is not 
actually used are among the most common and abusive kickback schemes.” Id. Furthermore, 
the OIG noted that examples of such situations are when “physicians who entered into office 
rental contracts with other referring physicians, solely in order to obtain the referrals, and 
diagnostic services companies and clinical laboratories that lease space from physicians which 
the laboratories in reality do not use, as kickbacks for the physicians’ patient referrals.” Id.  
 81. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the OIG 
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203 (July 21, 1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 1001). The OIG noted that “[b]ecause of the broad variety of transactions subject to the 
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute and the ability of individuals to manipulate the 
safe harbors in ways not contemplated, we believe that a general rule preventing sham 
arrangements from receiving safe harbor protection would be appropriate.” Id.  
 82. 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,530. 
 83. Id. The OIG explained: 
We emphasize, however, that for purposes of determining compliance with the safe 
harbors, we will evaluate both the form and substance of arrangements. To be 
protected, the form must accurately reflect the substance. As we have explained in the 
context of space and equipment rentals: If a sham contract is entered into, which on 
paper looks like it complies with these provisions, but where there is no intent to have 
the space or equipment used or the services provided, then clearly we will look behind 
the contract and find that in reality payments are based on referrals.  
Id. 
 84. Id.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/11










2003]  Sham Transactions 371 
 
However, when it failed to enumerate the specific circumstantial 
evidence that demonstrated a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 
the OIG left the final determination of whether a transaction was a 
sham to the courts.85 
B. Anti-Kickback Statute Case Law and Sham Transactions 
Cases involving the Anti-Kickback Statute identified some of the 
different transactions that constituted sham transactions.86 In United 
States v. LaHue,87 the defendants, attending physicians at a university 
hospital, desired an increase in their salaries.88 The defendants did not 
receive their request, but received an attractive offer from Baptist 
Hospital, a competing hospital in the area.89 The contract Baptist 
Hospital offered was primarily for consulting services.90 The 
defendants accepted the contract and substantial referrals began to 
occur to Baptist from the defendants, while referrals to the university 
hospital decreased.91 At the same time, the defendants were receiving 
compensation while not performing most of their contractual 
obligations.92  
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to support conviction.93 The court focused on the fact that 
the Director of Geriatric Services at Baptist Hospital was not aware 
 
 85. Id. This is supported by the fact that the OIG did not expand on the “form versus 
substance” determination. Id.  
 86. United States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220, 1230-1231 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
LaHue, 261 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
 87. 261 F.3d at 993. 
 88. Id. at 997. 
 89. Id. At this time, the defendants had significant amounts of patients that required 
referrals for inpatient hospitalization. Id.  
 90. Id. at 997-98. In addition, the parties conducted negotiations in a different manner by 
establishing a fee for services first and then determining what services the defendants were to 
perform. Id. at 997. There was testimony indicating the fees were higher than the normal 
amount for similar services. Id.  
 91. Id. at 998. 
 92. Id. at 998-1000.  
 93. Id. at 1005. The court determined that “the evidence produced at trial clearly 
demonstrated defendants negotiated and entered ‘consulting’ contracts in an attempt to 
camouflage an underlying agreement to exchange remuneration for patient referrals . . . 
[t]herefore, defendants’ conduct is the very conduct contemplated by the Act.” Id.  
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of the contract between the defendants and the hospital, yet the 
standard practice warranted the director’s knowledge of such 
agreements.94 Despite concerns about the defendants’ compensation 
and lack of services performed, no action was taken by the hospital to 
stop the defendants from receiving compensation.95 Moreover, 
hospital management knew that the defendants were being paid much 
more than the standard compensation for their services.96  
Courts have also found evidence of a sham transaction when one 
is compensated for services that did not cost anything to provide, or 
when such compensation significantly deviates from fair market 
value.97 In certain circumstances, such arrangements “lack[] 
economic reality.”98 In United States v. Hemmingson, Ferrouillet, an 
attorney, assisted a failed mayoral campaign in New Orleans.99 The 
campaign incurred substantial expenses generating heavy debt.100 
When Ferrouillet failed to raise sufficient funds to pay off the debts, 
he entered into a contract with the defendant.101 Under the contract’s 
terms, Ferrouillet initially received $20,000 in the form of a retainer, 
and would then draw $1,000 per month for his consulting services.102 
When Ferrouillet received the money, he deposited half of the 
proceeds into an account to pay off the campaign debts.103  
The defendant and Ferrouillet were indicted for their fraudulent 
acts.104 The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that they 
complied with the contract in good faith.105 Based on the fact that no 
work was performed on the contract, yet proceeds were drawn by 
 
 94. Id. at 999-1000.  
 95. Id. at 1000.  
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., LaHue, 261 F.3d at 999; McClatchey, 217 F.3d at 830; United States v. 
Schluneger, 184 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053, 
1057 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 351-53 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 98. Buckmaster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1997 WL 266963, *3 (U.S. Tax Ct. 
1997). 
 99. 157 F.3d at 351-52. 
 100. Id. at 352.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. The contract was boilerplate and did not contain unique drafting terms. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 352-53. 
 105. Id. at 354. The court determined that the defendant intended the check to go to the 
“campaign funds” account. Id.  
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Ferrouillet, the court determined that the contract was a sham.106  
Case law has also indicated that deviation from normal standards 
of practice or protocol may constitute circumstantial evidence 
demonstrating a sham transaction.107 In Hemmingson, the Fifth 
Circuit held that deviation from normal industry practice (in this case, 
the practice of law) demonstrated that the parties never intended to 
comply with the terms of the contract.108 Similarly, in LaHue, the 
Tenth Circuit focused on the fact that the Director of Geriatric 
Services at Baptist Hospital was not aware of the contract between 
the hospital and the defendants.109 The court reasoned that under 
normal practices, the director of such a department would know 
about agreements that were occurring within the department.110 The 
court also placed emphasis on evidence indicating that the 
defendants’ fees were higher than the standard amount for similar 
services.111  
Contracts created before or during a transaction to conceal the 
illegal acts of a party have also been held to constitute sham 
transactions.112 In United States v. Harris, the defendant was 
president and CEO of two corporations.113 The corporations entered 
into a loan contract with a bank that enabled them to borrow funds 
for business operations secured by the corporations’ assets.114 In 
return, the bank required the corporations to maintain minimum 
levels of capital.115 When the corporations began to suffer financial 
 
 106. Id. at 354-55.  
 107. See, e.g., id. at 354; LaHue, 261 F.3d at 997-99; Buckmaster, 1997 WL 266963, *4 
(U.S. Tax Ct. 1997). But cf. Boese & McClain, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that the government 
“ignore[s] certain technical violations of the AKA”). 
 108. 157 F.3d at 354. 
 109. 261 F.3d at 993. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 1006. 
 112. See, e.g., McClatchey, 217 F.3d at 830; Jinro America Inc. v. Secure Investment, Inc., 
266 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1576 (10th Cir. 1994); Gerlach v. John Deere Co., 897 F.2d 1048, 
1050 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1982); Cook’s 
Bryan, Inc. v. State of Texas, 459 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (“Making a contract 
to accomplish an illegal purpose can be expected to try to conceal that purpose.”). 
 113. 79 F.3d at 225-26. International Inc. was one company, located in Puerto Rico, and 
Arochem was the other company providing management services to International. Id. at 226. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship










374 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:357 
 
hardships the defendant overstated their financial worth to pass an 
audit.116 The defendant directed the corporations’ management to 
conceal deficits by creating false contracts showing a generation of 
income.117 The corporations successfully passed the audit and used 
the report from the auditors to secure funds from the bank.118 The 
corporations continued incurring losses, but their financial statements 
continued to show earnings.119 When it appeared that they were not 
going to pass the next audit, the defendant created more false 
documents to conceal deficits.120  
The defendant received numerous indictments upon the bank’s 
discovery of the corporations’ true financial status.121 The court found 
that defendant committed bank fraud.122 In finding fraud, the court 
focused on the fact that when it was apparent to the corporations that 
they were not going to pass the audits, the defendant concealed the 
financial status of the corporations to obtain more funds from the 
bank.123 These acts of concealment constituted sham transactions 
punishable under the Anti-Kickback Statute.124  
Prior case law also indicates that when someone is eligible to 
receive funds based on fraudulent statements, such transactions are 
shams.125 In United States v. Schluneger, the federal government 
granted a contract to Minelli for various projects along the Arkansas 
 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. The managers from the companies also “created false documents, such as false 
warehouse receipts and warranty titles, in an effort to make it appear that the . . . contract has 
been performed.” Id. Even after these efforts, however, the companies still needed to conceal 
additional deficits, and thus the managers “responded by altering documents to indicate that the 
$25 million in oil purchases had been paid before the end of the prior fiscal year.” Id. at 227.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 227. “The sham contracts added approximately $47 million to the assets of the 
Companies.” Id.  
 121. Id. at 231-32. 
 122. Id. at 231. Specifically, the “indictment stated that, in order to conceal and disguise 
the nature, location, source and ownership of funds [Harris] transferred approximately $7.5 
million . . . knowing that these funds were the proceeds of frauds on financial institutions.” Id. 
 123. Id. at 232. The necessary evidence was the bank extending credit by relying on “on 
the fraudulent monthly financial statements and borrowing base reports provided by the 
[defendants].” Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., In Re Gerlach, 897 F.2d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Schluneger, 184 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Thompson, 125 F. Supp. 
2d 1297, 1299 (D. Kansas 2000). 
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River.126 In the event that Minelli defaulted on the contract, the 
defendants acted as guarantors, covering any loss to the federal 
government.127 Minelli subsequently defaulted on the contract, and 
the defendants elected to perform the remaining contract obligations 
themselves using subcontractors.128  
At the time of the default, the unpaid balance on the contract was 
$1,690,000 and the defendants accepted a bid from Skyline to 
complete the contract for $1,200,000.129 The defendants informed the 
federal government of their intent to complete the contract and 
proceeded accordingly.130 Unknown to the federal government, 
however, the defendants had arranged for transactions with the goal 
of stealing money from the federal government.131  
The defendants arranged for Skyline to complete the $1,690,000 
project for only $1,200,000, with the remaining $490,000 going to 
the defendants.132 The defendants justified their receiving this 
additional money pursuant to another contract providing consulting 
services to Skyline.133 These fees, however, were false, as the 
defendants had no intention of performing any consulting work.134 
When Skyline decided to breach the contract with the federal 
government, the defendants’ plan was discovered.135 The defendants 
were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government.136 The court 
focused on the fact that the defendants’ inflated bids made them 
eligible for reimbursement levels to which they were not entitled.137 
 
 126. 184 F.3d at 1156.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 1157. 
 130. Id. This agreement prevented the defendants from receiving any compensation from 
the work performed, except those costs incurred in the completion of the work. Id.  
 131. Id. Specifically, the defendants “entered into a series of agreements . . . which had the 
intent and effect of billing the government for more than their actual costs and expenses.” Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. Under the terms of the contract between the defendants and Skyline, Skyline 
would pay defendants, under a different name, almost 30% of each payment Skyline received 
from the federal government. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1157-58.  
 137. Id. at 1158. Moreover, “[a]lthough Skyline believed these fees to be legitimate, in fact 
they were bogus, and, as the evidence at trial showed, [the defendants never] performed any 
consulting work.” Id. at 1157. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The OIG becomes concerned when the form and substance of a 
transaction do not correlate, suggesting a sham transaction in 
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The fact patterns in the case 
law discussed in Part III focus on circumstantial evidence sufficient 
to demonstrate a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Specifically, 
the conduct this circumstantial evidence demonstrates must run afoul 
of Congress’s intent to prevent inducements and to protect legitimate 
business transactions, and the courts’ concern with whether or not 
one intends to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. 
One interpretation of the statute’s prohibition of remuneration 
through federal health care programs advocates a policy of 
preventing individuals from receiving payments for work that they 
have not done. As previously discussed, prior adjudication has 
explored scenarios exploiting federal reimbursement, and has deemed 
such scenarios illegal shams.138 Federal health care programs are 
designed to provide assistance for individuals in need, and 
reimbursement to companies that provide such assistance. Deceptive 
tactics to receive reimbursement from the federal government is not 
only illegal, but also runs afoul of many of Congress’s concerns upon 
enacting the Anti-Kickback Statute.139 
The Anti-Kickback Statute’s legislative history stresses 
Congress’s concern about the misapplication of funds reimbursed 
under federal health care programs.140 Congress indicated that one of 
the main contributors to excessive increases in health care costs141 
and the depletion of funds from state and federal health care 
programs142 is improper reimbursement. Moreover, such 
 
 138. See supra Part III.B-C.  
 139. See supra notes 8, 15, 28, 29, 63. 
 140. Id.  
 141. See supra note 35. It is evident that money is a very important factor for both 
Congress and the OIG. This is apparent in Congress’s concern related to legitimate discounts 
not subject to the Anti-Kickback Statute benefiting the federal health care programs. See supra 
notes 69-70. 
 142. See supra notes 8, 35, 63. Congress was concerned about the stability of state and 
federal health care programs; this stability is clearly contingent upon the amount of funds 
available for reimbursement of services provided.  
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inappropriate reimbursement143 creates a burden on taxpayers,144 
making it difficult for the federal government to determine 
appropriate reimbursement levels under federal health care 
programs.145  
As previously discussed, prior adjudication has held that 
significant deviations from standard practices provide circumstantial 
evidence of sham transactions.146 It is evident from the Statute’s 
legislative history that both Congress and the OIG want to protect 
legitimate business deals from the restrictions of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.147 Congress’s explicit language exemplifies this policy 
against infringing upon legitimate arms-length transactions,148 
especially those that financially benefit federal health care 
programs.149 This intention is supported by the creation of exceptions 
and safe harbors, such as discounts.150 Nevertheless, critical to such a 
“shield” from the ramifications of a violation of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute is the legitimacy of such transactions.  
Although the courts apply different standards in determining 
whether one intends to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute,151 the cases 
discussed reveal how circumstantial evidence can demonstrate intent 
to violate a particular statute. The notion that a lack of economic 
reality may provide circumstantial evidence of a sham transaction 
correlates with the legislative history and the regulations of the Anti-
Kickback Statute.152 However, it is difficult to determine the 
 
 143. The author suggests that this behavior is inappropriate based on the language of 
Congress in describing such behavior as unethical by those individuals in the industry. See 
supra notes 15, 63.  
 144. See supra note 35. 
 145. See supra note 69. 
 146. See supra Part III.B-C. Courts have indicated that certain deviations clearly support 
that a particular contract was not legitimate and a sham, such as (1) no performance of a 
contract yet financial compensation, (2) inappropriate billing for services, and (3) breakdowns 
in communication between appropriate parties.  
 147. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra note 69. 
 149. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 71-72. It is evident that the OIG approved legitimate discount 
arrangements as not susceptible to the provisions of the statute when they benefited all parties, 
including the government. See supra note 69. 
 151. See generally supra Part II.B (discussing the different approaches used by the courts 
in determining intent to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute). 
 152. See supra discussion in Part III.B (discussing fake arrangements as violations of the 
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economic reality of a transaction when the reimbursement is for 
services that are never performed.153 In addition, the creation of false 
documentation to conceal an illegal act, or the concealment of an 
illegal act after becoming aware of an inquiry by the federal 
government, provides the necessary circumstantial evidence of a 
sham transaction and a violation of the statute. As mentioned, there 
are explicit instructions on how providers should report certain 
transactions, such as discounts.154 These compliance requirements 
provide a motive to create false documents to appease the 
government. Nevertheless, a deliberate deviation from the normal 
standards of operation provides circumstantial evidence of a willful 
violation if the normal operations were subject to the limitations of 
the statute.  
In each of these scenarios, the circumstantial evidence indicates 
an intentional violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Unless 
someone is involved in illegal activities, there appears to be no other 
reason for the creation of false documentation.155 
V. PROPOSAL 
The Anti-Kickback Statute vests the OIG with the authority to 
administer and interpret regulations. The OIG attempted to clarify 
which transactions constitute violations of the statute.156 As 
implemented, however, it is the courts, not the OIG, who determine 
whether the evidence is sufficient to show a violation of the statute. 
 
Anti-Kickback Statute). 
 153. See supra discussion in Part III.B. See also supra notes 97, 120 and accompanying 
text (citing cases which hold that a lack of performance, supplemented with financial 
compensation, demonstrates a lack of intent to comply with contractual terms, making such 
transactions shams). Congress was clearly concerned about abuses of federal health care 
programs when enacting the statute, and these actions only drain from the federal health care 
programs, taking money away from needy individuals. See supra notes 8, 63. There is clearly 
no intent to perform a contract when one receives reimbursement for services not performed, 
thus negating any good faith and fair dealing effort required by Congress.  
 154. See supra note 72. 
 155. See supra notes 112-24. The prior cases have noted a common theme that someone is 
knowledgeable about their legal requirements when they decide to create false documentation 
to make it appear as though their actions are legitimate.  
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This approach has produced inconsistent interpretations of the intent 
standard which courts use under the Anti-Kickback Statute.157 To 
remedy this situation, the OIG should provide clarity on 
circumstantial evidence, exemplifying when the form and substance 
of a particular transaction constitute a sham under the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.  
Such additional guidance would be beneficial in three ways. First, 
as discussed, the OIG has the vested authority to enumerate 
regulations relating to the Anti-Kickback Statute.158 Even though 
prior adjudication and professional scholarship have attempted to 
ascertain Congress’s intent behind the Anti-Kickback Statute, the 
legislative history indicates that in the ever changing field of health 
care, the OIG should facilitate clarity on Anti-Kickback Statute 
issues.  
The OIG’s clarification of the type of circumstantial evidence that 
would demonstrate when the form and substance of a transaction 
constitute a sham transaction would assist in the debate as to the 
intent requirement. Clearly, cases in which there are likely to be 
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute should not be determined 
based on what intent requirement is used, or what definition of 
“willful” is adopted by the court. Rather, such cases should focus on 
whether or not the accused party attempted to do something that 
Congress was trying to prevent.  
The different scenarios proposed still appear to violate the statute, 
even though the intent debate is not apparent. In the various scenarios 
discussed, the willful intent of the alleged violator is so palpable that 
the issue of what “intent” test to use or what definition of “willful” to 
adopt is immaterial. There is not an “intent” requirement if sufficient 
evidence demonstrates that someone created false documentation to 
conceal transactions that would ordinarily constitute a violation of the 
Statute. Whether an individual is concealing their actions from those 
monitoring the transactions, or is receiving prohibited funds, there is 
intent to deceive the federal government.  
 
 157. See supra note 153 (discussing the different interpretations of a willful intent to 
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute). 
 158. See supra notes 77-85. 
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The OIG’s clarification of what actions constitute a sham 
transaction would provide guidance to those in the health care 
industry. It is clear that Congress and the OIG want to ensure that 
legitimate business practices in the health care industry are not 
subject to the provisions of the Anti-Kickback Statute.159 Moreover, 
the legislative history indicates that many transactions can appear to 
fall within the restrictions of the Anti-Kickback Statute, yet should 
not be subject to such restrictions.160 The potential state of 
bewilderment a health care provider might be subjected to from this 
language could be clarified though additional guidance from the OIG. 
Such information would assist health care professionals in the 
manners in which they operate and how their contract formation can 
comply with the statute and regulations.  
Another approach to this problem is to put the “sham contract” 
terminology in the Anti-Kickback Statute itself. Having the 
regulations as the only source to address the issue may not be the best 
approach, as more individuals may attempt to take advantage of a 
growing industry. More importantly, even though prior adjudication 
may be used as authority for an agency’s interpretation of a particular 
statute, inconsistency is less likely to be demonstrated when 
Congress’s intentions are directly addressed in the statute. 
Each of these suggestions are realistic. The OIG has the authority 
to interpret the statute, and can provide ample time for notice and 
comments from those within the industry. The OIG interpretations 
might take time, but they could potentially prevent countless dollars 
in litigation and provide clarity for those within the health care 
industry. Although incorporating the sham transaction terminology 
directly into the statute may require a great deal of slow-moving 
legislative reform, the amendments are feasible and appropriate in 
light of Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute.  
 
 159. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns that Congress 
and the OIG had in ensuring that legitimate business deals were not subject to the provisions of 
the Anti-Kickback Statute).  
 160. See supra note 68 (discussing when legitimate business transactions do not have to 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the Anti-Kickback Statute to prevent abuse of 
federally funded health care programs. Although the statute itself 
contains areas where its vagueness opens doors to potential abuse, 
Congress has provided the OIG with the authority to protect against 
such abuses through the promulgation of regulations. The OIG has 
begun to address the creative means by which certain individuals 
have attempted to take advantage of such vagueness by indicating 
that it would initiate investigations when certain transactions 
appearing legitimate are actually not.  
With the continued amount of money potentially available to be 
subject to fraudulent actions of others, individuals willing to take 
such risks will become even more creative in their schemes to drain 
federally funded health care programs. The OIG will need to express, 
through regulations, the various types of transactions that constitute 
sham transactions. Such actions will provide prosecutors and other 
legal officials with the authority to enforce the Anti-Kickback 
Statute, with guidance on what evidence to look for, and with the 
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